

ProTO: Proactive Topology Obfuscation Against Adversarial Network Topology Inference

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Network Topology



Network diagnosis



VOIP

1



Failure localization

Motivation

• Advancing attackers' malicious objectives

DDoS attack DNS poisoning Internet censorship

- Disturbing network diagnosis
- Leaking commercial interests and private information

Motivation

DDoS attack

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• Advancing attackers' malicious objectives

It may not always be desirable or even prohibitive to disclose network topology

• Leaking commercial interests and private information

Topology Inference

- There are mainly two types of topology inference techniques
 - o Internally cooperative topology inference
 - > Disable internal routers' response to traceroute or ping
 - Advanced designs, such as NetHide

o External end-to-end topology inference

Topology Inference

• There are mainly two types of topology inference techniques



- Disable internal routers' response to traceroute or ping
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External End-to-end Topology Inference

• Topology recovering example



Countermeasures

- Intuitive way: detect-then-disable
 - Attacker may notice and develop follow-on actions
 - o False alarm
- Our Design: <u>Proactive Topology Obfuscation (ProTO)</u>
 - o Detect-then-obfuscate
 - Proactively delay packet forwarding
 - o Deliver a structurally accurate yet fake topology to the attacker

ProTO

• ProTO consists of two major modules: (i) identification and manipulation module and (ii) topology control module



Probe Packet Identification

- We develop a lightweight k-Nearest Neighbor (light-k-NN) approach to identify probe packets.
 - ✤ A multi-round dynamic method to adaptively train the weights
 - ✤ A voting-based lazy-learning update strategy

Light-k-NN is as easy as traditional k-NN to be used, but is more suitable for ProTO for real-time network devices.

Topology Obfuscation

• Routing matrix



• Inference formulation

The measurement results $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{A}\boldsymbol{\mu}$ Link delays

Topology Obfuscation

• Topology obfuscation

The measurement results
$$\mathbf{Fx} = \mathbf{FA}\boldsymbol{\mu}$$
 Link delays
 $\mathbf{FA} = \mathbf{A}_m$ Fake topology

Goal of topology obfuscation

Find the manipulation matrix F, given the real topology A and the fake one A_m

System Implementation

- ProTO is implemented in P4 integrated with Python.
 - It is hardware independent and can be compiled to different realistic network devices. (Thanks to P4)

- Use real-world network topologies from Internet Topology Zoo
- Each node is created as a virtual machine that runs OpenWrt

Evaluation of Probe Packet Detection

 ProTO achieves a detection rate of 99.9% and a false alarm rate of around 3%



Evaluation of Topology Obfuscation

• Effectiveness Metric

similarity score =
$$1 - \frac{\text{TED}_0}{\text{TED}_1 + \text{TED}_2}$$

TED = Tree Edit Distance

 TED_0 = distance between tree 1 and tree 2 TED_1 = distance between tree 1 and zero-node tree TED_2 = distance between tree 2 and zero-node tree

Effectiveness of Topology Obfuscation



Similarity score between the inferred topology and the real topology without protection.

Similarity score between the inferred topology and the real topology under protection.





Similarity score between the inferred topology and the intended topology.

Performance Cost of Topology Obfuscation



The performance cost of normal packets that are misidentified as probe packets and delayed by ProTO

	Low Utilization	High Utilization
Claranet	1.28%	1.93%
Switch	1.33%	1.95%
Cogent	1.35%	1.99%

The average performance cost of all normal packets



We develop a practical system ProTO that adopts a detect-thenobfuscate framework to combat adversarial network topology inference.

Evaluation results show that ProTO can effectively and efficiently defend against potential attacks.

