

From Jammer to Gambler: Modeling and Detection of Jamming Attacks against Time-Critical Traffic

Zhuo Lu[†], Wenyue Wang[†], and Cliff Wang[‡]

[†] Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
North Carolina State University, Raleigh NC, US.

[‡] Army Research Office
Research Triangle Park NC, US.

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- 1 Motivation
- 2 Preliminaries
 - Modeling for Time-Critical Transmission
 - Modeling for Jamming Attacks
 - Performance Metric
- 3 Main Results
 - Analytical Modeling
 - Experimental Evaluation
- 4 JADE: Jamming Attack Detection based on Estimation
- 5 Conclusion

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Time-Critical Wireless Networks


Emerging cyber-physical systems (notably [the smart grid](#)) have provided a new paradigm for wireless network design.

- Time-critical wireless networks.



Why Time-Critical?


Example: A substation protection scenario.



- IED: Intelligent electronic devices
- B needs to tell A: Do not break your circuit!

Jamming Issue in Time-Critical Networks

Example: A substation protection scenario.



- A jammer can severely disrupt time-critical communication.


Existing results can not be readily adopted in time-critical networks.

- Jamming modeling and evaluation: [packet delivery/transmission ratios](#) (Xu'02), [number of jammed packets](#) (Li'07), [network throughput](#) (Bayraktaroglu'08).

Exiting Works and Issues

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With no understanding of jamming impact, it is hard to design efficient detection methods.

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A fundamental question:

How to model and detect jamming attacks against time-critical traffic in wireless networks?

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Requirements for Time-Critical Transmission

Time-critical messages require

- Highest priority,
- Low processing delay,
- No buffering and queuing.


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IEC 61850 is a recent standard for power substation communication.


- **GOOSE** (Generic Object Oriented Substation Events) messages have **3ms** and **10ms** delay requirements for power device **protection**.
 - Simple retransmission mechanism: no any flow control.



Modeling for Time-Critical Transmission


Modeling for time-critical transmission.

- A direct map from the application layer to MAC layer.
- Retransmission of a failed packet until the deadline.




Models for Jamming Attacks

Various jamming models available in the literature (Xu'02, Bayraktaroglu'08)



Models for Jamming Attacks


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In this paper, we consider **reactive jamming** as it is the primary focus in existing work.


Performance Metric

The goal of time-critical network is to deliver time-critical messages with specific delay thresholds.



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


The metric should

- 1 be **message-oriented**.
- 2 directly **reflect the delay constraints**.

Performance Metric

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Message Invalidation Ratio


For a time-critical message with delay constraint σ , the message invalidation ratio is defined as

$$r = \mathbb{P}\{D > \sigma\},$$

where D is the end-to-end application-layer delay of the message.

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Problem Formulation for End-to-End Delay



The end-to-end application delay:


$$D = \sum_{i=0}^N d_i,$$

where d_i is the i.i.d. delay for i -th retransmission at the MAC layer, and N is the number of retransmissions.

The message invalidation ratio: $r = \mathbb{P}(D > \sigma)$.

Assumption: Dumb Transmitter


Assumption: A dumb transmitter **always re-sends** a transmission-failed packet until it is successfully delivered to the receiver.



- The number of retransmissions N can go to infinity.
 - enables **asymptotic analysis**. (Malone'07, Bayraktaroglu'08)


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Practical challenge: A message is retransmitted until the deadline.



- N is an upper-bounded random variable dynamically coupled with the cumulative delay in history.
- Mathematically, N is a **stopping time**. (need **non-asymptotic tools!**)

Martingale Theory

An effective tool to solve **stopping time related** mathematical problems.

- Part of the motivation is to formulate some problems in gambling.


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Gambler's ruin

In each play, he wins (or, loses) 1 dollar with probability p (or, $1 - p$).



What is the probability that the gambler can win the game?


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


What is the probability that the gambler can win the game?

From Jammer to Gambler

The Jammer is a gambler

- Delay \Rightarrow money
- Delay threshold \Rightarrow gambler's winning goal.



- Message invalidation: the jammer **keeps jamming each transmission** of a message such that the cumulative delay is larger than the delay threshold.
- The gambler wins: the gambler **keeps winning each play** such that the cumulative money is larger than his goal.

Analytical Results Based on Martingale Theory

Theorem (Message invalidation ratio for general cases)

Given a jamming strategy $\mathcal{J}(p)$, the message invalidation ratio r is

$$r = \frac{\mathbb{E}(D_s) - \frac{c}{1-p_a}}{\mathbb{E}(D_s) - \frac{p_a c}{1-p_a} - \mathbb{E}(D_u)},$$

where $p_a = p^{N_{mac}}$, N_{mac} is the retry number at MAC layer, $c = \mathbb{E}(d_i)$ is the mean of the i.i.d. MAC-layer delay d_i , $D_{s \leq \sigma}$ is the end-to-end delay of a successfully delivered message, and $D_{u > \sigma}$ is the delay of failed message delivery.

Theorem (General upper bound)


For the message invalidation ratio r in Theorem 1, it satisfies that

$$r \leq \frac{p^{N_{mac}} c}{(1 - p^{N_{mac}})(\sigma - c) + p^{N_{mac}} c}.$$

Indication of Analytical Results

Phase transition for message invalidation ratio:

- **Slightly-increasing** phase: increases negligibly with the increasing of the jamming probability p .
- **Dramatically-increasing** phase: increases dramatically (and linearly) with the increasing of the jamming probability p .



Experimental Evaluation: Setups

Setups:


- Network: a WiFi-based substation network. (WiFi Alliance'09, Kanabar'09, Akyol'10)
- Jammer: USRP with RNU Radio.
- Time-critical messages: 4 GOOSE applications.

 **200ms** for anti-islanding (Kanabar'09).

 **16ms** for transfer trip protection (Kanabar'09).


 **10ms** defined in IEC 61850 (Type1/P2).

 **3ms** defined in IEC 61850 (Type1/P1).




Experimental Results: Message Invalidation Ratio

GOOSE messaging between a transmit-receive pair under jamming.



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JADE: Jamming Attack Detection based on Estimation



- 1 Transmit a number of packets.
- 2 Estimate the jamming probability \hat{p} based on transmission results (e.g. no ACK)
- 3 if $\hat{p} > p^*$, jamming exists. The threshold p^* is chosen smaller than the transition point: $p^* = 0.3$.

Experimental Results of JADE

Jammer: time-varying with jamming probability p uniformly distributed on $[0.4, 0.9]$.

Benchmark: the Likelihood Ratio (LLR) Test (Li'07) is the theoretically optimal detector for deterministic models.

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Table: **Detection Ratios** of both JADE and LLR Test

Number of Samples:	50	100	150	200
Detection Time:	54ms	109ms	163ms	218ms
JADE:	98.6%	99.1%	100%	100%
LLR Test :	91.3%	92.1%	92.5%	91.6%

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- The LLR Test has a **model mismatching problem** in dealing with a practical time-vary jammer.

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Conclusion

- 1 Motivated by emerging time-critical wireless applications, we introduce the **message invalidation ratio** to quantify the impact of jamming attacks against time-critical traffic.
 - Theoretical results: Gambling based modeling.
 - Experimental results: GOOSE messaging in IEC 61850.
- 2 We show a **phase transition phenomenon** for the message invalidation ratio.
 - Slightly-increasing phase.
 - Dynamically-increasing phase.
- 3 We developed a **JADE system** to achieve simple, efficient and robust jamming detection for power substation networks.

Thank you!